The coevolution of sacred value and religion by Handfield, Toby
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rrbb20
Religion, Brain & Behavior
ISSN: 2153-599X (Print) 2153-5981 (Online) Journal homepage: https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rrbb20
The coevolution of sacred value and religion
Toby Handfield
To cite this article: Toby Handfield (2019): The coevolution of sacred value and religion, Religion,
Brain & Behavior, DOI: 10.1080/2153599X.2019.1678512
To link to this article:  https://doi.org/10.1080/2153599X.2019.1678512
Published online: 27 Dec 2019.
Submit your article to this journal 
Article views: 61
View related articles 
View Crossmark data
The coevolution of sacred value and religion
Toby Handfield
SOPHIS, Monash University, Victoria, Australia
ABSTRACT
Sacred value attitudes involve a distinctive profile of norm psychology: an
absolutist prohibition on transgressing the value, combined with outrage
at even hypothetical transgressions. This article considers three
mechanisms by which such attitudes may be adaptive, and relates them
to central theories regarding the evolution of religion. The first,
“deterrence” mechanism functions to dissuade coercive expropriation of
valuable resources. This mechanism explains the existence of sacred
value attitudes prior to the development of religion and also explains
analogues of sacred value in non-human species. The two remaining
mechanisms, “assurance” and “coalitional,” are more likely to have been
involved in the cultural evolution of specifically religious behavior. In the
assurance mechanism, sacred value attitudes increase the cost of
ideological commitments, making them more reliable as signals of a
cooperative disposition. In the coalitional mechanism, sacred value
attitudes make it dangerous for third parties to dissent from a social
norm, and thus discourage competitor ideologies. While both these
mechanisms are compatible with major accounts of the evolution of
religion, different theories suggest a greater or lesser emphasis on one
mechanism or the other.
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Two focal phenomena for an evolutionary understanding of religion are ritual and supernatural
belief. Both give rise to serious puzzles. Rituals are often costly—in psychological, biological, and
material terms—and lack obvious returns to fitness that would make those rituals adaptive. Given
all this, why do they persist? Similarly, why are supernatural religious beliefs so prevalent? Given
human cognitive systems have been subject to adaptive pressures such that they produce true beliefs
about many fitness-relevant domains—folk-physics, social relations, and animal threats, for instance
—why should those same cognitive systems be tolerant of beliefs that are at best underdetermined by
the available evidence, and often in stark contradiction to the laws governing the visible, natural
world?
While these two puzzles deserve their prominence in the field, there are other religious phenom-
ena that warrant scrutiny. In this article, I propose an evolutionary account of a stereotypical reli-
gious attitude: the attitude of holding something to be sacred. Sacred objects, relations, or norms
are imbued with an exceptionally high level of subjective value, and violations of sanctity inspire dis-
tinctive forms of condemnation and protest. Sacred valuing is a ubiquitous feature of human reli-
gious communities, and many sacred values have significant impacts on fitness. I argue there are
likely to be at least three evolutionary mechanisms that have made it adaptive to hold sacred values
at various points in human history, and identify some differential implications which would enable
future researchers to estimate the relative significance of these different mechanisms.
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The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I present my working definition of sacred values
and a rough categorization of varieties of sacred value. In Section 3, I describe three distinct mech-
anisms that could explain the adaptive benefit of sacred value attitudes, and show how each mech-
anism gives rise to novel predictions. In Section 4, I turn to religion more broadly, and relate my
account of the evolution of sacred value to what is known about the evolutionary history of religion.
Section 5 concludes.
2. What is a sacred value?
For the purposes of this inquiry, I understand a sacred value to have two defining features:
First, those who uphold a sacred value will, in paradigm contexts, regard honoring that value as an
absolute requirement. They will refuse to consider trading off the value against other goods, and may
insist it is “beyond price.” For instance, someone who regards a particular religious object as sacred
will not consent to destroy that object, even for enormous sums of money.
This apparent “pricelessness” of the sacred has to be qualified or restricted to particular contexts,
however, because it is often possible to show, through choices under uncertainty, that an implicit
price is ascribed, even to a sacred value. For instance, how much would a sacred valuer be willing
to spend on additional insurance measures that lower the probability of their sacred object being
desecrated? Presumably there is some point at which additional improvements in safety of the sacred
value are no longer considered worth the additional cost, which in turn implies that there is a “price”
on securing the sacred value. Despite this, it seems reasonable to focus on the central contexts—those
in which explicit desecration is being considered, rather than mere remote probability of desecration
—as most revealing of the distinctive attitude of a sacred valuer.1
Second, not only are sacred values regarded as distinctively valuable, but sacred value transgres-
sions generate a distinctive set of moral emotions. Offering to buy somebody’s house for a very low
summay generate some irritation, but it typically won’t generate outrage. Offering to purchase some-
thing held sacred, however—be it a loss of honor, the desecration of a religious object, or the per-
formance of a taboo behavior—is likely to generate anger, indignation, and may motivate outright
retaliatory or punitive behavior.2
The outrage generated by sacred value transgressions can be further divided in terms of outrage at
(i) actual or (ii) hypothetical transgressions, and whether the transgressor is (a) the sacred valuer, (b)
an interlocutor, or (c) a third party (first, second, and third-person transgressions, respectively; see
Table 1 for a summary). In many ways the most distinctive variety of sacred outrage is experienced in
response to hypothetical first-person transgressions: (“How dare you even suggest that I behave in
that way?”) But I will cast a wide net at this stage of the inquiry, and allow that a sacred value
must be one which generates any one or more of these six sub-types of outrage.
A notable omission from the above definition of the sacred is any concept of the supernatural or
mystical. While there is significant interest in studying the specifically religious manifestations of
sacred value attitudes, the present project requires adopting a broader definition, with a view to iden-
tifying the role of sacred value attitudes in the origins of religious behavior and organization. Incor-
porating the supernatural into the definition of the sacred risks trivializing the relationship between
Table 1. Varieties of outrage and indignation that may arise regarding sacred value transgressions.
Location of
transgression Actual Hypothetical
First personal “I feel so guilty/ashamed at having
transgressed”
“I cannot tolerate the thought of transgressing in that
way (how dare I even think of it!)”
Second personal “I’m angry that you transgressed my sacred
value”
“How dare you consider transgressing my sacred value!”
Third personal “We should do something about the person
who transgressed this value”
“I’m outraged that there are people who might
transgress this value”
2 T. HANDFIELD
the two. That said, there may well be interesting further dimensions of the sacred-as-supernatural
which the present inquiry will of necessity overlook.3
Having given a functional definition of sacred value attitudes in very general terms, a broad range
of objects may fall under the definition. The following examples all appear to be candidate sacred
values, at least in some communities. The examples are organized into three categories that will even-
tually be shown to have theoretical motivation: each of the three mechanisms I posit to explain the
evolution of the sacred will most naturally map onto one of the three categories of sacred value
object.
It will become evident from contemplating the examples discussed below that what it means to
transgress a sacred value is often not derivable from knowledge of the sacred object itself. In Abra-
hamic cultures, cannibalism of one’s deceased ancestor may be a transgression of a sacred family tie,
whereas in other cultures such cannibalism could be the appropriate means to celebrate the ancestral
connection. To possess a sacred value with respect to an object, therefore, is better understood as
having internalized some culturally specific norms that express the relevant valuation. There may
be some patterns of agreement across cultures as to what constitutes valuing/desecrating a sacred
object, but this cannot be assumed in advance.
A. Relationships to in-group members Motivations of loyalty and devotion to friends and family
are often held as sacred. Someone who puts a price on their friendship is not regarded as a true
friend, and suggesting to someone that they might be willing to betray a friend, a spouse, a sibling,
or a parent, will often generate intense negative, retaliatory emotions.
Not only are actual relationships imbued with sacredness, but symbols of those relationships are
held sacred too. Consider suggesting to a husband or wife that they swap their wedding ring for a
materially indistinguishable substitute (Medin, Schwartz, Blok, & Birnbaum, 1999); or asking a
patriotic citizen to use their national flag as a dishcloth.
B. A distribution of entitlements Resource conflict is a ubiquitous feature of human society. When
those conflicts revolve around claims to entitlements that are tied to the identity of a group, we often
see examples of sacred valuation. The disputants will be uninterested in accepting any alternative
compensation for forgoing the claim, and they will actively protest transgressions, both actual and
hypothetical. Recent protests by indigenous Australians against tourists traversing Uluru, for
instance, are not complaints that there is inadequate financial compensation being paid for this
transgression: rather, the implicit claim is that Uluru should not be climbed, at any price (Hitch
& Hose, 2017). Disputes over the legitimacy of Jewish settlements in the West Bank of Israel, the
existence of a Palestinian right of return, and related issues are similarly liable to be examples of
sacred entitlements (Ginges, Atran, Medin, & Shikaki, 2007).
In addition to these concrete entitlements which may be held as sacred, more abstract entitle-
ments, such as equal rights or basic liberties sometimes appear to be sacred. Consider asking a
committed believer in democracy whether they would tolerate an arbitrarily restricted franchise
(denying women the vote, for instance) in exchange for greater economic prosperity—this sort
of offer is likely to be rejected, without any attempt to consider the relative weight of the values
at stake.
C. Sacred norms As noted above, all sacred values are characterized in terms of distinctive norms
which embody the distinctive valuation attitude towards some focal object. In some cases, however,
there seems to be no clear object of the valuation other than the norm itself.4 Norms regarding diet,
violence, sexual behavior, and various taboos tend to fall in this category—and all religions have
some such norms. In contemporary western society, norms regarding sexuality tend to be
among the most potent and most likely to generate outrage. Many of the most formidable insults
involve allegations of deviant sexuality, and offering a stranger in a bar money to perform a taboo
sexual act is probably one of the most reliable ways to trigger a violent response, at least from
males.5
Apart from the absence of an intelligible value object, sacred norms can be distinguished from
sacred entitlements and sacred loyalties by the universalising attitude that is held toward such
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norms. The focus of enforcing sacred entitlements is to defend a value object from out-group mem-
bers who may compete for the resource. The focus of enforcing sacred loyalties is to defend a coop-
erative relationship from free-riding in-group members. The focus of sacred norms, in contrast, is to
uphold a normmore generally, without particular regard for group membership, but among all those
who constitute the relevant moral community. This may be partly explained, at least for norms invol-
ving sex and violence, by the fact that what norm the community adopts will have significant fitness
impacts on all. It also may be relevant that these norms are likely to be solving a host of coordination
problems that arise among families who live together and intermarry. Once a package of solutions is
found to those coordination problems, the package as a whole will have significant inertia, and can-
not readily be modified in modular fashion (Sterelny, 2007, p. 325). Technologies for hunting, fora-
ging, and violence, in contrast, can be experimented with and incrementally varied without risking
disruption of the entire domestic cooperative scheme.
These three categories are not meant to be either mutually exclusive or exhaustive, but they give
an initial means of organizing the space of sacred values. Some other examples appear to cross cat-
egories: a patriot might refuse to burn the flag, even for a million dollars. There seem to be grounds
for thinking flag-burning is a sacred norm violation—it generates very broad condemnation in the
relevant community. But there is also a case for thinking it a case of sacred valuation of a relation-
ship—in this case loyalty to the nation. Another example is upholding the honor of one’s family, tribe
or similar group. While all human societies display some regard for honor, there are some cultures
whose norms imply that honor is not merely valuable but sacred (Black-Michaud, 1975; Boehm,
1984; Miller, 1990). Honor in these cultures usually requires one or more of: hospitality, honesty,
sexual chastity of females, and courage and vengefulness from males. Defense of honor motivates
a number of extreme behaviors, including lethal violence. Suggesting to a member of such a culture
that their honor may be foregone for money or some other non-sacred incentive would be a risky
proposition.6 The defense of honor may be likened to defense of an entitlement: losing one’s standing
as an honorable family will have adverse economic consequences, leading to ostracism or victimiza-
tion in future. Honor is thus a sort of asset that can only be maintained by strict refusal to trade with
it. But sacred valuation of honor may also be a manifestation of loyalty to one’s group: often the indi-
vidual who carries out a risky act of violence for defense of honor does not personally benefit from
the sacrifice. So the willingness to defend honor is something done, not merely for oneself but for
extended family, and the family is the primary source of shame and opprobrium for the individual
who fails in this duty (Thrasher & Handfield, 2018).
3. Mechanisms for the evolution of sacred value
Before considering further the possible role of sacredness in the evolution of religion, consider three
hypothesized mechanisms that predict adaptive benefits of sacred value attitudes. Each mechanism
most readily applies to one of the particular sacred object categories described above.
3.1. Deterrence (entitlements)
Recall that sacred valuers will not “trade” the sacred object for mere material rewards, and attempts
at trade will typically generate not mere rejection, but anger. Why would it be adaptive to develop
this additional emotional response?
Any trading encounter occurs in the shadow of possible defection: one’s trading partner might
simply steal the good they desire. This risk of robbery was even greater in the ancestral environment,
where enforcement of property rights would have relied on weak institutions at best, and often be a
matter of self-help.7
Consider a simple model of a trading partner’s choice situation when contemplating whether to
trade or steal. The expected value of the desired object is V(x), which is characterized by some uncer-
tainty—one can never know in advance the exact fitness value of an object, and the value of an object
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not in one’s possession is likely even more uncertain. The value of a trade can then be represented as
V(x)−V(y), where y is the item forgone in exchange for x.
The expected value of robbery, on the other hand, we represent as pV(x) − c, where p is the prob-
ability of success in obtaining the resource, and c is the expected cost of retaliation and/or conflict
that will ensue.
Suppose our agent estimates that for some offered object y, V(x) −V(y) > pV(x) − c, and also
V(x) − V(y) > 0, so decides to offer the trade. If the holder of x refuses, what should the agent
infer from this? First, the agent will infer that, for the other party, the values of x and y are such
that the trade is a bad deal. Further, the agent may infer V(x) is greater than was first surmised.
Of course, trade requires that agents have different valuations for traded goods, otherwise all
exchange will be zero sum and one party will decline. But we may assume there is some positive cor-
relation between the two parties’ valuations. So the fact that the other party rejects the trade allows
our agent to infer something about V(x): our agent should update her credences such that x is judged
more valuable to herself. In turn, this is likely to make robbery look like a more attractive option: the
price required to purchase x is greater than initially estimated, and the benefit from possessing x is
also going to be greater than initially estimated.
So refusing a trade is inherently risky: it sends a signal that might prompt more aggressive action
by the trading partner. In this context, what is the effect of manifesting outrage at the very prospect
of trade? It signals the cost c of theft is likely to be high also. It is thus a way of trying to deter
possible predatory responses that may follow from a refusal to trade (see Figure 1). This hypothesis
for the adaptive benefit of sacredness attitudes fits very naturally with sacred value attitudes towards
entitlements: these are precisely the sorts of entity which give rise to both opportunities for trade
and the threat of expropriation by force. Consistent with this idea, perhaps the paradigm example
of a sacred entitlement is a claim to land: a resource that is often the object of fierce competitive
pressure.
Figure 1.What an agent infers from a refusal to trade. Mere rejection of a trade makes theft more attractive, because it signals that
the object in question is more valuable than initially estimated. Angry rejection sends a signal that attempted theft will be met with
harsh retaliation, and hence reduces the risk of theft.
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Relatedly, sacred valuers appear to perceive events central to their sacred values as closer in time
—past or future (Sheikh, Ginges, & Atran, 2013). Although this phenomenon has not been demon-
strated to affect subsequent decision-making, it is plausible that such temporal perceptions promote
a relatively low temporal discount rate in decisions relevant to the sacred value. In turn this would
imply a willingness to endure protracted conflict for the sake of ultimately securing a contested enti-
tlement. In models of ongoing conflict, the decisive trait for victory is having a low discount rate on
the future—being patient, in other words (Hammerstein & Parker, 1982). Hence the psychology of
sacred values appears an excellent fit for this sort of strategic environment.
3.2. Coalitional (sacred norms)
Paradigm bargaining encounters involve fixed parties of determinate strength, competing for a given
resource. Many social conflicts, however, depend crucially on a prior coordination issue: who will
align themselves with whom? Once the composition of the relevant coalitions is evident, there
will often be no need for actual conflict: the weaker side will simply capitulate.
DeScioli and Kurzban (2013) have argued that many of the distinctive features of moral codes can
be explained by understanding them as a social technology to manage the problem of coalition-for-
mation in conflict. Consider two simple strategies for coalition formation: band-wagoning and alli-
ance-seeking. The band-wagoner, seeing a nascent dispute, chooses to side with whomever they
believe would win the conflict. So in any conflict among band-wagon strategists, the stronger, bigger,
more powerful individual will tend to attract allies, and the weaker party will be bound to capitulate.
This sort of coalitional strategy, if widely adopted, will generate a hierarchical society, in which the
pecking order determines who will recruit allies, and hence who will win any conflicts that arise. It
also generates a strong temptation to despotic behavior: the strongest individual can pick a dispute
with anyone, confident of the necessary support to win.8 The alternative, alliance-seeking strategy is
to side with whomever will most likely return the favor of support in future conflicts. This strategy
requires more cognitive sophistication, because it entails weighing up future prospects and alterna-
tive strategic configurations. The outcome of using this strategy is less predictable also. DeScioli and
Kurzban suggest alliance-seeking is likely to lead to a society more akin to a Hobbesian state of
nature: not necessarily a state of outright combat, but an uneasy situation of shifting alliances, con-
stant vigilance, and political intrigue. Both strategies are relatively inefficient, and stultifying to econ-
omic production. There is no incentive to generate a surplus under a despot who will expropriate it,
and while the alliance-seeking solution may lead to enough security to inspire somewhat higher
levels of production, it still entails weak property rights and a high probability of mis-coordination
and conflict.
An alternative is to have a set of norms that coordinate responses to conflict in a more egalitarian
fashion. DeScioli and Kurzban suggest the coordination can come from an informal set of impartial
norms, especially norms that lead to clear verdicts of who is wrongdoer and who is victim. This is the
posited function of “moral” rules.
From a social perspective, this solution has obvious advantages. If the rules reliably achieve
coordination, they will deter victimization and theft much more effectively: any prospective trans-
gressor will know she is likely to face the wrath of the entire community. Property rights will be
more secure, and society should be more peaceful overall. That said, it may not be obvious why
such an alternative should be evolutionarily viable: how does it benefit individuals to undertake
the enforcement of impartial norms on third parties? Two lines of existing research help to address
this puzzle without invoking cultural group selection (which may provide yet a third means of
explanation).
First, agent-based models demonstrate that third parties may benefit from redistribution of
resources from high fitness individuals to the less fit (Gavrilets, 2012). This result depends on the
degree to which fitness depends on relative resource allocation. If the reproductive ecology
approaches a “winner takes all” dynamic, then in any given encounter between individuals with
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differing fitnesses, third parties will benefit if the encounter leads to a redistribution from fitter to less
fit. This can make it adaptive for an individual to sacrifice fitness in order to assist a weaker individ-
ual against a stronger bully. So impartial norms that promote a more egalitarian distribution may be
supported by this logic.
The second line of evidence comes from comparative ethology and anthropology. Christopher
Boehm, in his study of hunter gatherer societies and their use of violence to control bullying and
domineering behavior (Boehm, 1999), observes strong norms of egalitarianism. He documents expli-
cit methods of social control and influence adopted by these communities to settle conflicts without
establishing positions of political power, and from the cross-cultural uniformity of these techniques,
infers they are evolutionarily stable.
DeScioli and Kurzban argue that many of the distinctive features of moral rules can be explained
by the functional constraints on rules adapted for this purpose of coordinating coalition formation.
For instance, the tendency of moral rules to proscribe actions rather than omissions is explained
because it is much easier to detect that someone has performed a transgressive action than that
they performed a transgressive omission (p. 491). They also suggest successful moral rules will
tend to be absolutist, rather than allowing for casuistry and cost/benefit calculations to justify par-
ticular exceptions (p. 479). This is again because it is important that the entire community can
quickly achieve consensus on who is the wrongdoer and who is the victim, without protracted inves-
tigation of the background context in which the dispute arose.9 Most importantly, DeScioli and
Kurzban predict this process will favor rules that are impartial (pp. 486–7). Adopting partisan pos-
itions, supporting those who have supported one in the past or who are likely to offer support in
future, and so forth, will invite the Hobbesian variety of conflict settlement once more. Of course,
kin selection will entail constant temptations to partiality, and so we should expect an ongoing ten-
sion between pressures towards partiality and pressures toward observing the society’s rules in a
more impartial fashion.
Recall the category of sacred norms. DeScioli and Kurzban’s account lends itself to explaining sev-
eral features of such norms. In particular, it explains why they are absolutist, and why they tend to
prohibit particular actions that are regarded as sacrilegious, more than they tend to require positive
actions. These are both predicted to arise from pressure to make the rules feasible as coordination
devices in settings where information is limited and decisions must be made quickly. Further, it
suggests why this category of sacred values tends to make demands more broadly than just on the
immediate in-group: because these are norms that are posited to address conflicts that may arise
between kin-groups, they will only be effective if upheld by a large proportion of the entire commu-
nity. And the sorts of norms that are held sacred have exactly the features predicted by DeScioli and
Kurzban: they tend to proscribe actions, they tend to be absolute, and they tend to be impartial. So
much of the phenomenology of sacredness is explained immediately by the present account.
The outstanding question for this coalitional hypothesis is whether it explains the distinctive
emotions of outrage and indignation associated with sacred values. To answer this, recall that we
distinguished actual versus hypothetical transgressions and outrage directed towards trangressions
that occur in the first, second, and third person. Emotional responses to second-person transgres-
sions are straightforward to explain: if you transgress against my sacred norms, anger and outrage
are presumably playing some sort of straightforward deterrence role, motivating me to undertake
costly punishment for your behavior. What is more distinctive of sacred value attitudes is anger
at mere hypothetical transgressions, and anger at first-person and third-person transgressions.
The prototypical first-personal emotion in response to an actual transgression against a norm is
guilt or shame. A number of accounts have been offered to explain the benefit of emotions that
motivate compensatory behaviors or costly apologies, as part of a process of rehabilitation and
reintegration to the community (Frank, 1988; Martinez-Vaquero, Han, Pereira, & Lenaerts, 2015;
O’Connor, 2016). First-personal emotions in response to mere hypothetical transgressions may be
some sort of byproduct or complement of this mechanism: a means of deterring oneself from tempt-
ing transgressions.
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The typical third-personal emotion, in contrast, is one of anger or outrage. Outrage in response to
actual transgressions appears explicable in terms of the need to advertise one’s willingness to under-
take costly punishment, so as to coordinate the collective punishment of the transgressor. If everyone
agrees who is the wrongdoer, but no one is motivated to do anything about it, the community’s
norms are unlikely to have much deterrent effect on future occasions. Outrage in response to
hypothetical transgressions is much less discussed in the literature, but I suggest it is likely to
serve some sort of signaling/recruiting role. In particular, where there is any risk that the community
does not have a clear coordination point, by floridly disapproving of a hypothetical behavior, an indi-
vidual may increase the likelihood of successful coordination in punishment of future, actual cases.
This conjecture predicts third-person hypothetical outrage (and perhaps other cases of hypothe-
tical outrage) will be greatest in cases of norms that are weak or contested in the relevant community.
In almost all societies there are very clear norms proscribing particular types of violence, for instance.
Manifesting one’s outrage at a hypothetical murder in such a society is not an effective signaling
device, because no one is surprised at the idea of coordinating punishment against a murderer.
But norms regarding homosexual behavior for instance, may be much less clearly established. Adver-
tising one’s outrage at the mere prospect of homosexuality in one’s midst (or conversely, at the mere
prospect of homophobia in one’s midst) is thus a way to try to shape the emerging normative order
in a preferred fashion. So curiously, more extreme expressions of sacred value behavior are predicted
to be a feature of norms that are less well established, rather than those that have a broad consensus
in the community.10
The coalitional mechanism described so far is largely a matter of sacred valuers deterring others
from indulging competitor beliefs: “you better not believe that or else!” A second possible role for
sacred valuing, however, is as a proof of sincerity. If adopting a sacred value entails personal costs
because it motivates fitness-sacrificing behaviors, this constitutes powerful evidence that the pro-
fessed belief is sincere. Joseph Henrich has argued the cost of religious ritual in general may be
explained by a dynamic whereby:
(1) religious ideology, when believed, makes the accompanying ritual behaviors seem less costly
(because they predict divine reward);
(2) the costliness of the ritual behaviors (“credibility-enhancing displays” or CREDs), at least to
non-believers, makes it hard to think the professed belief is hypocritical or insincere.
Together, this makes the combination of belief and ritual an attractive package for a cultural lear-
ner seeking to adopt the beliefs and practices of successful agents, notwithstanding that the ritual
behavior entails genuine loss of fitness (Henrich, 2009). To the extent that sacred values help trans-
late ideological beliefs into costly CREDs, this may be a second mechanism by which sacred value
contributes to stabilizing religious doctrine, by contributing to the recruitment of a coalition of
supporters.
3.3. Assurance (relationships)
Assurance problems arise in cooperative settings where an optimal result requires individual choices
that make us vulnerable to the choices of others. The collective outcome may not be achieved, not
because of outright selfishness, but through a mere lack of mutual trust. The challenge then is to
achieve mutual assurance of each other’s reliability in performing the group beneficial behavior.
Cooperation in a stag hunt is the standard example from game theory, in which by pursuing the opti-
mal outcome (hunting stag), I make myself vulnerable to the behavior of others, but by taking the
safe option (hunting hare), I can guarantee a modest payoff regardless of what others do.11
If we suppose there are a diversity of types in the population, some of whom are more motivated
by the collective good than others12, then it may be possible to develop a signal that one can be
counted upon to cooperate. Behaviors that are costly, public, and complements to group
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participation are particularly good candidates because they will be less costly for communal individ-
uals than for selfish individuals, and hence selfish types will be unwilling to send the signal and can
thereby be “priced out” of the communal activity (Skyrms, 2010; Spence, 1973; Zahavi, 1975). An
extreme example: burning the net used for catching hares is a prohibitive activity for someone
who plans to hunt hare, but is no cost at all for someone who plans to hunt stag (see Figure 2). If
the potential stag hunters observe the other hunters burn their nets before beginning, they can be
much more confident of a successful stag hunt.
Unlike the Deterrence hypothesis and the Coalitional hypothesis, which apply to competitive
interactions, this is a cooperative setting, where the concern is to minimize free riding, rather than
to best a competitor.
Costly signaling hypotheses have been developed to explain a number of religious behaviors, but
not sacred values in particular (Bulbulia, 2004; Irons, 1996; Sosis & Alcorta, 2003). In the typical case,
signals are overt actions, such as the sacrifice of an animal, or participation in a painful, time-con-
suming, or otherwise costly ritual. These behaviors are very well suited to a signaling role because
they are easy to observe, hard to fake, and highly salient. Sacred value attitudes, understood as absol-
ute refusals to undertake a certain sort of behavior, are apparently a poor fit for this sort of signaling
account. Failure to do a particular thing is not readily observed, more easily faked (one can try to
perform the transgression later, on the sly), and is unlikely to be as salient as an overt ritualized
performance.13
A related model that may be more helpful for understanding the possible signaling role of sacred
value prohibitions is a screening account. Screening models are much like signaling models, except
that where in a signaling model the signaler “moves first” by sending a signal to which they hope the
receiver will favorably respond, in a screening model the receiver is first mover: setting up some
obstacle that the sender must pass in order to obtain favorable treatment. Application fees (for
graduate programs, social clubs, etc.) are a good example. The requirement to pay a fee will reduce
the incentive for low quality individuals to apply, because they have a lower prior probability of being
selected. Thus although the fee will reduce the number of applicants, it will increase the average qual-
ity of candidates to choose from.
In the religious setting, Lawrence Iannoccone predicts religious orders will develop screening
mechanisms of this sort with the aim of increasing the average level of religious commitment in
the group, even at cost of making the group smaller (Iannaccone, 1992). Effective screening mech-
anisms are requirements that complement religious participation and are economic substitutes for life
Figure 2. An assurance signal in a stag hunt game. In (a), the players face a standard stag hunt, in which (Stag, Stag) is a payoff
dominant equilibrium, while (Hare, Hare) is risk dominant. In (b), we see the transformed payoffs after the row player has destroyed
the net they would use to catch Hare. This is an activity that would be costly if row player intended to hunt Hare, but has no impact
on that player’s payoff if she hunts Stag. The differential costs allow this to serve as a compelling signal that she intends to hunt
Stag, increasing the likelihood that the two agents achieve the payoff dominant equilibrium.
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outside the religious group—this makes them relatively “cheap” for pious individuals and “expens-
ive” for those who are less committed. An example might be the requirement to wear stigmatizing
symbols of group identity. Such requirements are much more burdensome on someone who wishes
to maintain an active social life outside and to participate less fully in the religious community. Dres-
sing in ceremonial robes, wearing an eccentric style of hair, and refusing to drink alcohol are all
rather unappealing for someone who wishes to go to a nightclub, but are much less burdensome
for someone who wishes to remain with the congregation to spend their leisure hours.14
This explains the role of all manner of absolute prohibitions that may be sacred value attitudes:
dietary restrictions, manners of dress, requirements to undertake prayer at prescribed times. Abso-
lutism is explained as a simple matter of monitoring costs: it is much more difficult for the commu-
nity to enforce a rule that allows occasional exceptions than to enforce an absolute prohibition. But
this explanation does not obviously explain the second feature of sacred value attitudes: why should
they lead to distinctive moral emotions?
It may be this is an instance where, even after screening has occurred, there is still a strategic
incentive to engage in additional signaling of one’s virtues.15 Two acolytes may both conform
with the requirements to dress in a particular way, to restrict their diets, and so forth, but one
may strive to differentiate himself by additional demonstrations of zeal. By manifesting public out-
rage at hypothetical or actual transgressions, one is sending some sort of signal of one’s reliability and
commitment. Although this signal might appear easy to fake, our disproportionately harsh judgment
of hypocrites suggests that moral condemnation is a risky strategy that can therefore be a reliable
signal of good character (Hok, Martin, Trail, & Shaw, In press; Jordan, Sommers, Bloom, & Rand,
2017).
In addition to first-person outrage at hypothetical violation of the sacred, third-person outrage at
third-person violations may be a type of costly signal also. Sometimes a group will not only enforce a
norm within their group, but create a norm of protesting against the non-compliance of out-group
members, who may regard the rule as eccentric or erroneous. The Westboro Baptist Church’s cam-
paign in recent years provides an example. They have picketed the funerals of US soldiers with slo-
gans like “Thank God for crippled soldiers”, “God hates you”, “Fag troops”, and the like (Chen,
2015), to express the group’s belief that America’s misfortunes in war are a punishment from
God for toleration of homosexuality. These behaviors stigmatize the group relative to mainstream
society, and thus complement group participation while making out-group activities less attractive.
This sort of costly activity has all the standard hallmarks of a signal of assurance: it imposes differ-
ential costs on those who are more or less committed to group participation; it is an overt action that
is salient and hard to fake; and it is costly.16
3.4. Summary and differentiating predictions
The three mechanisms described above all predict that some varieties of sacred value behavior are
adaptive, and each mechanism is apt to be put to further empirical test. All the mechanisms are
grounded in theories that have been developed independently in a broader context, but they
make distinctive predictions in the setting of sacred value. Each mechanism suggests a distinctive
category of object that is subject to sacred value attitudes, and suggests a particular sort of social audi-
ence for one’s sacred value displays. These predictions are summarized in Table 2.
Table 2. Mechanisms by which sacred value attitudes may be adaptive, and the corresponding predicted value objects and
audiences for display of these values.
Mechanism Sacred value object Preferred Audience
Deterrence Entitlements Competitors for the entitlement
Coalitional Candidate norms, especially controversial norms Potential norm-enforcing coalition partners
Assurance Complements of group participation Potential collaboration partners
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4. Sacred value in the evolution of religion
For these purposes, we construe religion in naturalistic, behavioral terms, as involving:
. Supernatural beliefs in agents or forces that have some concern for human affairs
. Ritualized behaviors, performed in some sort of communion. These behaviors are, at least in part,
ways of expressing and communicating some of the relevant supernatural beliefs
. Costly sacrificial behaviors which are believed to have some influence over the supernatural agents
So understood, religion is a widespread, perhaps universal, feature of human communities. Dat-
ing its origin is difficult, given the absence of clear archaeological markers, but there is very little evi-
dence to support the existence of religion prior to 100 kya, and gradually increasing evidence
thereafter. In the last 10,000 years before present, we have clear evidence of organized religions in
hierarchical societies that are able to construct elaborate architectural monuments such as pyramids,
moai, ziggurats, and more. Sterelny (2018) argues further that religion is unlikely to have a single
causal origin: it appears to be a robust feature of human communal life, readily reinvented after
population shocks, unlike material technologies such as the making of fire, which have been lost
to several populations in human history (Henrich, 2015, loc. 1381). So any account of the origins
of religion must rely on circumstances that are relatively ubiquitous, but not overly ancient.
Sacred values appear to be particularly relevant to the development of “book” religions as opposed
to “traditional” religions. This contrast is drawn in several dimensions (Hayden, 2019, pp. 5–11;
Howells, 1948), but one particularly significant dimension is that of exclusivity. Traditional religions
tend to be less hostile to other religious beliefs and traditions. Hayden goes so far as to say that there
is significant innovation and experimentation in traditional religious practice (p. 15)—the opposite
of what we associate with mainstream modern religions. Relatedly, traditional religions are less
tightly associated with moral systems (Rappaport, 1999).
These suggest strongly that the coalitional mechanism—which functions to promote a favored
norm—has been of limited relevance in the development of traditional religions, and was important
primarily for book religions. A pressing question for future research is whether this can be attributed
to supply side pressures (lack of social technology to enforce exclusive norms and religious uniform-
ity) or demand side pressures (did circumstances change to make book religions a more adaptive
cultural package).
Before considering the specific role of sacred values in the evolution of religion, consider two
recent, prominent accounts of the evolution of religion itself. The key difference between these
accounts is in the relative temporal and causal priority of the cognitive and ritualistic elements of
religion.
On the “belief-first”model (Atran & Norenzayan, 2004), agents developed supernatural beliefs as
a means of mastering existential anxieties which were particularly challenging in the ancestral
environment. Early hominins who initiated sleeping on the ground rather than in trees were exposed
to a novel range of predatory threats at night.17 Environmental pressures—attributable to the sub-
stantial changes in climate that occurred towards the end of the paleolithic—are likely to have forced
individuals to venture into a broader range of foraging environments, thus encountering new
hazards. And increasing cognitive sophistication entailed that at some point some hominins were
the first to have the ability to comprehend their own mortality.18 In addition to these manifold
sources of anxiety, because the presence of agentive organisms in the environment poses such a
high risk, we may have evolved a specific cognitive bias to be hypersensitive to traces of agency, lead-
ing to a propensity to adopt agentive explanations even on very thin evidence (Guthrie et al., 1980).
These, and possibly other factors, are hypothesized to promote supernatural accounts of natural
phenomena and other proto-religious ideology.
This class of models conjectures that religious rituals developed later and some of them became
especially effective at transmitting religious beliefs across generations. Someone who tells a far-
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fetched tale across the campfire may entertain, but is unlikely to inspire mass belief. But participating
in a lengthy, demanding ritual as an expression of one’s belief in a religious doctrine carries far more
persuasive weight. By melding together belief and ritual in mutually sustaining packages, religions
developed through processes of cutural selection such that only those combinations which were bet-
ter adapted for faithful transmission have tended to survive.
On the “ritual-first” model, costly rituals arise without supernatural ideology, as an assurance
mechanism to promote in-group cooperation. Some accounts stress the importance of change in
food-gathering practices which became less mutualistic and instead relied upon temporally extended
reciprocal relationships (e.g., Sterelny, 2018). Hunting bands traveled further, for longer, and upon
returning, if unsuccessful, would be dependent on more successful band members to share. Foraging
of this sort is high risk and cannot develop without social insurance mechanisms. Other accounts
stress the challenge of intergroup conflict, which give rise to problems of free-rider management
(e.g., Sosis, Kress, & Boster, 2007). But whatever the proximate challenge, all these accounts focus
on ritual as a means of solving a pressing social dilemma. Rituals function as a credible signal of
reliability, and thus promote cooperation.
Sterelny (2018) accounts for religious ideology in this paradigm as a side effect of the peculiarities
of ritual experience. Because rituals tend to involve stressful, psychically bizarre experiences, they
generate a demand for explanation. Supernatural doctrines, because they are so difficult to falsify,
are then peculiarly susceptible to be adopted to explain these experiences, and become part of the
package of norms and practices constituting the group’s identity.
While the two types of theory disagree regarding the temporal sequence of events and the relative
importance of different processes, the key causal mechanisms regarding costly rituals are compatible,
and may both have been important in explaining religion’s overall evolutionary trajectory. On the
belief-first account, ritual behaviors signal conviction to neophytes, and thus increase the likelihood
that otherwise incredible supernatural beliefs can spread to future generations with high fidelity. On
the ritual-first account, the central causal role of ritual is as a technology of assurance, like a hand-
shake or drinks with business colleagues.
The account to be developed below can be summarized as follows:
(1) Deterrence type varieties of sacred value predate religion, and played little distinctive role in the
evolution of religion.
(2) To the extent that the evolution of religion was driven by forces that promoted cooperation (the
ritual-first account), this suggests a significant role for sacred value to contribute via the assur-
ance mechanism.
(3) To the extent that the evolution of religion was driven by a process of cultural learning that did
not directly address a cooperative problem (the belief-first account), the coalitional mechanism
is likely to have been more important in explaining the contribution of sacred value.
4.1. Entitlement-type sacred value predates religion
My account begins with the claim that the sort of sacred value attachments associated with entitle-
ments and a deterrence mechanism pre-date religious phenomena. There are two reasons for this
assertion. First, deterrence would appear to require less cognitive sophistication than the other
types of sacred value behavior. Second, while there is little or no evidence of other types of sacred
valuation in other species, there is evidence of deterrence-type valuing. The most striking such evi-
dence is the sensitivity to inequity demonstrated in a number of primate species (Brosnan & deWaal,
2003; Price & Brosnan, 2012), as well as both domesticated canines (Range, Horn, Viranyi, & Huber,
2009) and wolves (Essler, Marshall-Pescini, & Range, 2017). In the paradigm experiments, the test
animal will perform a task for a modest material incentive (food, or a currency token that can be
exchanged for food) but will refuse to do the same task in the presence of a conspecific that is
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being paid a significantly higher “wage.” Strikingly, when refusing to work in the presence of
inequity, capuchins will sometimes throw the offered wage back at the experimenter and wolves
will attack the experimental apparatus. This is suggestive of “indignation,” which is partially defini-
tive of sacred values proper.
If we grant that deterrence-type sacred value behavior was present in hominins prior to the ori-
gins of religion, this provides a precursor that may have been co-opted by the other two mechanisms.
The key challenge is then to explain what pressures in the environment may have generated a
demand for one or the other varieties of sacred valuing in the specific context of religion’s evolution.
4.2. Religion as a solution to an assurance problem
On the ritual-first account of the evolution of religion, ritual behaviors serve as an assurance device.
The selective pressure for these ritual behaviors is ascribed to a change in conditions which necessi-
tated riskier forms of cooperation. The posited increase in demand for coordination/assurance
devices fits naturally with the assurance mechanism hypothesized to explain some varieties of sacred
value. Similar arguments have been made to the effect that more challenging ecologies correlate with
more demanding initiation practices (Hayden, 2019, p. 104; Young, 1965) and with moralizing high
gods (Botero et al., 2014).
In particular, I conjecture some elements of religious ideology associated with religious behavior
became “sacralized” because this added value to the assurance function already being achieved by ritual
behaviors. Note on this account, religious ritual on its own—without a sense of the sacred—may
already be an assurance device. Initially, any ideology associated with that ritual, even if fervently
believed, is likely to be a less effective signal, because sincere belief is hard to observe. Adopting a sacred
value attitude, however, for reasons already discussed, makes belief more visible and costly.
Sacred values as means to heighten the signal value of religious participation might be particularly
important in partner matching situations, where individuals are not choosing to cooperate with a
large group but with a small number of select individuals. The choice of reproductive mate—one
of the most fitness relevant decisions of all—is of exactly this sort. A number of links between reli-
gious behavior and sexual reproductive strategy have been documented (Slyke, 2017)—several of
which suggest a role for signaling. If sexual selection is involved, it also may afford an explanation
of the extremity of sacred values (Miller, 2007). If there is competition for appearance of devoutness
in observation of local religious norms, it is not surprising to think that many individuals may end up
placing an “absolute” value on those norms: absent other constraints, this is a compelling equili-
brium solution.
By way of contrast, consider a case of assurance that occurs, apparently without sacred values.
Sporting teams, for instance, are engaged in something like a stag hunt every time they play: showing
up to the sportsfield is a little risky—if the others don’t come your time will have been wasted. Going
to the cinema instead may be less rewarding, but is at least not vulnerable to the choices of others.
Evidently, sporting teams very often succeed in maintaining the high risk, high reward equilibrium—
so positing sacred values as a means of assurance might seem otiose.
The example is instructive in the way it fails to refute the theory. First, I suspect many sporting
teams do share sacred values. Consider what would happen if the captain said she was going to leave
early this week, without participating in the traditional singing of the team song after the game,
because she has an opportunity to make $200 by participating in a darts competition.19 Many
teams would find such a transgression outrageous—monetary compensation should not be com-
pared to the values of solidarity with the team. Further, it is plausible that those teams who take
some sort of symbols of membership to be sacred will more reliably solve the assurance problems:
these teams will be able to undertake more risky ventures like extended tours, for instance. Second,
sporting activities are for the most part mutualistic opportunities for cooperation. By running fast
and hard to make a tackle, not only do I help my team-mates, I help myself too. Our interests are
strongly aligned, behavior is easily monitored, and debts do not need to persist unpaid for long
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periods of time. This is exactly the sort of strategic situation thought to characterize foraging and
child-rearing prior to the the paleolithic revolution, which could be solved by simple mechanisms
of mutualism and direct reciprocity (Sterelny, 2014; Tomasello, Melis, Tennie, Wyman, & Herr-
mann, 2012), so there is little wonder that an activity of this sort generates less demand for sophis-
ticated assurance devices such as sacred values.
Ancestor cults, which become prominent in prehistoric religion during the neolithic, might be the
first examples of sacred loyalties. Hayden (2019, pp. 183–5) observes that the importance of ancestor
cults appears to covary with the relative wealth of the society, and—drawing on work of Maurice
Freedman—suggests that ancestor worship was adaptive for family groups who possessed heritable
land resources that would require collective defence from competitors. Worship of an ancestor who
is associated with a particular territory appears to meet the differential cost/benefit requirements for
a costly assurance mechanism. If you want to be regarded as a reliable family member, it is relatively
low cost to observe rituals of respect and deference to the ancestors. If you wish to be integrated into
a competitor family, it is likely to be much more costly to observe such rituals.
In sum, if religion evolved as an assurance mechanism, then the assurance mechanism account of
sacred values is highly complementary. By taking religious ritual to be not just desirable but manda-
tory, and bymaking disapproval of transgression amatter of public display, the sacred valuer amplifies
the signal that would be obtained by mere conformity to the ritual. The account helps to explain why
religion is more than just costly rituals, but also includes ideology that is held to be sacred.
4.3. Religion as the product of cognitive bias and cultural competition
On the account that privileges cognitive processes and supernatural belief as the original basis of reli-
gion, supernatural belief is a response to management of existential dread, combined with cognitive
biases that are over-eager to identify intentional agency in the environment (“hyperactive agency
detection”). These elements alone predict supernatural belief, but do not impose any uniformity
of belief: all manner of idiosyncratic, personal, religious doctrines may arise. Supernatural belief
would be pluralistic and idiosyncratic without some sort of mechanism to coordinate and commit
individuals to a common creed. This is where ritual is hypothesized to play an important role:
younger generations will be more impressed by, and hence more likely to accept, beliefs that inspire
costly and arduous rituals (Henrich, 2009). As already noted under the coalitional mechanism,
sacred value attitudes may serve a similar function. By making belief more visible and costly, a sacred
valuer will increase the apparent sincerity of those beliefs.
In addition to inspiring additional recruits, because sacred value attitudes inspire anger and indig-
nation at the prospect of contradiction, they contribute to stabilizing the content of religious doc-
trine. Imbuing one’s supernatural beliefs with the attitude that contradiction warrants righteous
anger is a good way of discouraging others from exploring alternative ideas. Unlike the assurance
mechanism, which implies sacred value is enabling cooperation, this is a more competitive process,
which may be zero- or negative sum. The belief-first account suggests this may be the more impor-
tant role for sacred values.20
Again, consider a potential counterexample to this conjecture: the evolution of language.
Languages evolve over time, but by and large they do not splinter into mutually incomprehensible
idiolects. Given each person has considerable potential for linguistic innovation, and individuals do
not regard semantic and syntactic rules as matters of sacred value, how is it that languages avoid the
problem that is alleged to afflict religions?
This example also fails in an instructive way. Successful linguistic communication is the solution to
a coordination game, where interests are aligned. Whether we refer to this vegetable as an “eggplant”
or an “aubergine”, very little is at stake for any of us: the two solutions have no differential impact on
our fitness. But the sorts of outcomes that are facilitated by religious ideology very often do have
fitness impacts, and conflicts of interest arise. Religious ideology is used to justify and motivate
norms governing prime sites of selection pressure: marriage, reproduction, and treatment of children.
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Even if the norms facilitate cooperation, it is difficult to avoid subsequent conflict over how those
cooperative spoils are divided (Seabright, 2012). This entails that there is near constant pressure to
renegotiate the norms and adopt alternative ones, more favorable to one party or another. Hence
there is much more reason to anticipate that, without mechanisms such as sacred value attitudes
as stabilizing forces, religious norms would be more prone to division and conflict.
Again, ancestor cults may illustrate an early occasion where this mechanism becomes of rel-
evance. If there is competition within a family for control of a collective resource such as land,
appealing to a loved ancestor as an authority may be a particularly effective way of bolstering
one’s claim to inheritance (Hayden, 2019, pp. 184–5). An extreme instance of this ideological
value of ancestors is illustrated by Inka society, who regarded their emperors as immortal, and
thus never actually relinquishing control of their material resources, but nonetheless determining
the inheritance of power.
Because the royal mummies were not considered dead, their successors obviously could not inherit their wealth.
Each Inka’s panaqa [royal lineage] retained all of his possessions forever … The mummies spoke through
female mediums who represented the panaqa’s surviving courtiers or their descendants…
After smallpox wiped out much of the political elite, each panaqa tried to move into the vacuum, stoking the
passions of the civil war. Different mummies at different times backed different claimants to the Inka throne.
After Atawallpa’s victory, his panaqa took the mummy of Thupa Inka from its palace and burned it outside
Qosqo…
(Mann, 2006, loc. 1642–54)
To summarize this line of reasoning: if the major adaptive problem solved by religious practice is the
self-reflexive one of maintaining the religion’s stability and integrity through the vicissitudes of cul-
tural evolution, then sacred values are likely to have contributed to this process by the coalitional
mechanism. By advertising the norms one accepts through florid displays of outrage, and by threa-
tening punishment for defection from those norms, sacred valuers are agents of conservation amidst
potential innovation. There may well have been religions without sacred valuers in the past, but they
are unlikely to have survived with their doctrines intact.
In turn, this prompts the question: what is in it for the sacred valuers themselves. Why would they
care whether their local norms are preserved? Individuals will have more incentive for norm-conser-
ving behavior when there are significant resources whose division is affected by those norms—when
there is something worth contesting (recall the modeling result of Gavrilets (2012): coalitional behav-
ior is adaptive where there is a “spoils to the victor” reproductive economy). Hence the existence of
rich, defendable land resources, such as those seen in the Fertile Crescent at the beginning of the
Holocene, may have been a requisite factor for this mechanism to become operative.
Conclusion
It is simplistic to drive a sharp dichotomy between belief-first and ritual-first accounts of religion:
religion is a complicated set of behaviors and it is unlikely that only a single evolutionary mechanism
is involved in its development. The emerging picture is that there are two central sorts of process
which might explain sacred value as instrumental in the development of religion. The assurance pro-
cess is one whereby the display of sacred commitments signals to others “Trust me, I wouldn’t do this
if I weren’t intending to stick with the group.” The coalitional process is a more competitive type of
signal: “This is the norm we prefer around here, don’t mess with it.” Both processes probably
occurred at some point in the overall evolutionary history, regardless of temporal priority. These
processes are summarized in Figure 3.
A significant shortcoming in the argument sketched here is that at various points I have appealed
to the idea that sacred valuation can be an honest signal because it is a costly behavior. In some sense
this is trivially so: upholding a value that requires forgoing opportunities to transgress is a “cost.” But
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this observation is not enough to show that it is costly in the right way to sustain a signaling equili-
brium. Indeed, signaling models now exist in which there is arbitrarily little cost in equilbrium, but
the signals are reliable because of costs that arise only in counterfactual, out of equilibrium circum-
stances. It is because dishonesty would be very costly that we can trust the costless signals we observe
(Lachmann, Szamado, & Bergstrom, 2001). It is therefore pressing to develop differentially testable
predictions from these theories which can be taken to the field.
Further work on this issue is not only of significance in understanding the origins of religion, but
also the future of human cooperation. The role of the sacred in motivating terrorist violence behavior
has been well documented (Atran, 2014), and this paper has identified a possible role for sacred
values in perpetuating “culture wars” (see note 10). Given these significant costs associated with
the sacred, it remains an important open question to what extent sacred value is instrumental or
even essential in motivating prosocial behavior. Future empirical work will hopefully be able to dis-
tinguish the prosocial potential of sacred value mechanisms in different ecological contexts.
Notes
1. In terms of formal decision theory, sacred valuers probably violate (at least) the axiom of continuity, which
states that for any three states of affairs, A,B,C, the agent strictly prefers A > B C, if and only if there are prob-
abilities p,q, such that the agent prefers a lottery which offers A with probability p, C otherwise (denoted ApC),
over B, and prefers B over a lottery offering A with probability q, C otherwise. That is, ApC > B > AqC. Consider,
for example, the following states of affairs:
A = earn $10
B = earn $0
C = desecrate a sacred object
Figure 3. The roles of sacred value psychology as a coalitional device (right arrow) and as an assurance mechanism (left arrow).
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While it seems very plausible that a sacred valuer would rank A > B > C, there may be no probability p, such
that they are willing to rank ApC over B.
Given the difficulty in providing an adequate behavioral definition of what it means to regard a value as
“priceless”, it may ultimately prove more fruitful to investigate the underlying neuropsychological processes
in processing sacred values. Existing evidence here is promising: it suggests that when contemplating trans-
actions that transgress sacred values, individuals employ distinctive regions of neural tissue, associated with
deontological processing rather than weighing of costs and benefits (Berns et al., 2012).
2. Similar clusters of ideas – extremely high price and outrage at transgression – have also been referred to as “pro-
tected values” (Baron & Spranca, 1997) or “taboo tradeoffs” (Tetlock, 2003).
3. Some readers may also be interested to relate my definition of the sacred to Roy Rappaport’s influential work on
ritual and sacredness in evolution (Rappaport, 1999). Rappaport reserves the word “sacred” for relatively meta-
physical and unfalsifiable propositions that are foundational to a system of religious belief, and to that extent his
definition is quite alien to my own (pp. 280–1). He distinguishes, however, the sacred from the “sanctified”, and
allows that a very wide range of entities may be sanctified (by reference to the sacred), including norms, direc-
tives, authorities, and material objects (chap. 10). Sanctified directives or authorities – like the sacred – are
“unquestionable” (chap. 9), which resonates with my understanding of sacred values as absolute. Rappaport
does not appear to identify any emotions of outrage or indignation as essential to sanctification, though as I
will note below, some of his speculations as to the functional role of sanctification echo elements of the mech-
anisms I develop.
4. Consider a borderline case, the phrase “human life is sacred”. The relevant norms that this phrase typically
evokes rule out some forms of deliberate killing (murder, abortion, euthanasia), while tolerating others (violent
self-defense, warfare), and having an uneasy relationship with yet others (homicide by way of negligent driv-
ing). They certainly do not enjoin a consistent and domain-general attitude of preserving human life. So while it
is possible to interpet this value attitude as having an object – human life – doing so tends to obscure how very
specific and circumscribed the relevant norms are.
5. In empirical research recently conducted by the author, using a culturally diverse sample of undergraduates at
Monash University, participants endorsed a list of 62 value statements (derived from Berns et al., 2012), and
were subsequently offered up to $50 to sign the opposite statement. The only statement which a majority of
subjects refused to sign in exchange for the available monetary incentive was one that endorsed pedophilia.
6. Honor in these cultures is, on occasion, explicitly subject to monetary transactions, though usually only with
great contrivance and difficulty, and after other avenues have been exhausted. As an example, Christopher
Boehm’s description of the process of negotiating a peace to end a blood feud in tribal Montenegro involves
offering of significant compensation, but the compensation cannot be offered too quickly, nor accepted too
quickly, lest either side incur dishonor as a result (Boehm, 1984, chap. 7). The transaction then needs to be
witnessed by a disinterested council of observers, and occurs with great ceremony and banquet. Finally,
after the material compensation is offered, it is typically refused by the other clan, it being both dishonorable
to buy one’s way out of a blood feud, and dishonorable to accept such a transaction.
Graeber (2012, p. 133) observes that bridewealth, the currency used for contracting marriages in some
societies, is invariably distinct from the currency used for mundane transactions, symbolically denoting that
ordinary money cannot be used to buy a human being. He further observes that in societies with bridewealth,
the same special currency is used to pay blood debts.
7. Gintis, 2007; Brosnan, Jones, Gardner, Lambeth, & Schapiro, 2012 appeal to similar ideas to explain defensive
attitudes towards property in chimpanzees, humans and other species.
8. Chimpanzee society is typically despotic, in this sense (Boehm, 1999).
9. This is not to say that moral rules cannot have complicated logical form – witness the bewildering complexity of
attempts by philosophers to systematize intuitions about trolley cases (Thomson, 1990; Kamm, 2006). What is
important is that in typical cases, there is a strong prospect of consensus as to how to categorize with respect to
the rules.
10. This may go some way towards explaining the “culture wars” that are such a prominent feature of contempor-
ary western society, despite evidence that actual divergence in political values is diminishing, at least in the US
(Baker, 2005; Fiorina & Abrams, 2008). Florid outrage at transgressions of liberal values on one side, and at
“political correctness” on the other, may be attempts to shape the emerging consensus on social norms of
the future. New media technologies further catalyze this dynamic, making it exceptionally cheap to express out-
rage, and promoting the propagation of those expressions through large social networks (Crockett, 2017).
11. Repeated prisoners’ dilemmas have the same payoff structure: the low risk option is to always defect. The risky
option is to initiate cooperation, in the hope it will be reciprocated for long enough in the future to be worth the
initial sacrifice of self-interest (Skyrms, 2004).
12. Or who are less averse to the costs of contributing to the collective good – the two are equivalent at this level of
analysis.
13. Though signals that are difficult to detect are in themselves a type of costly signal. A recent model demonstrates
that in circumstances where the highest quality signalers are particularly choosy about who accepts the signal,
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rather than paying to produce a more extravagant costly signal, it can be preferable to “bury” one’s signal, lead-
ing to a probability that it will never be observed (Hoffman, Hilbe, & Nowak, 2018). This provides another
theoretical basis for sacred prohibitions – hard to observe sacrifices – as a costly signaling device.
14. See also Aimone, Iannaccone, Makowsky, & Rubin, 2013, which provides experimental evidence for related
mechanisms to solve the problem of cooperation in a multi-player public goods game. This is important,
given there has been some scepticism as to whether a signaling mechanism can solve the problem of achieving
cooperation outside of 2-player signaling contexts (e.g. Henrich, 2009).
15. This is not meant to connote “virtue signaling”, which is sometimes used to derogatively describe costless sig-
nals that have little prosocial benefit.
16. Jordan, Hoffman, Bloom, & Rand, 2016 argue, in a more austere modeling context, that third-party punishment
may be an effective signal of cooperativeness.
17. Skeletal evidence suggests thatHomo erectus was similarly inept at climbing trees as modern humans, as early as
1.8 mya (Wrangham, 2009). In which case, this might suggest an implausibly early origin for religion.
18. The earliest signs of deliberate human burial date from 100 kya (Pettitt, 2013), suggesting awareness of mor-
tality is at least this ancient.
19. Ironically, after inventing this example, I learned that a similar dispute in fact occurred between two Australian
cricketers – one being the captain who wished to hasten the singing of the team song after victory to attend
another social event (SBS News, 2015).
20. This is where the present account most resembles Rappaport’s ideas about the function of the sacred— or in his
terminology, the “sanctified”. He notes the development of cognitive capacities for language is accompanied by
enormous potential for behavioral flexibility, and that this poses a problem for social coordination. “[I]ntrinsic
to increasing flexibility… for the species… is a problem for the separate societies… : their members are not
genetically constrained to abide by the conventions governing them, and can easily… imagine alternatives,
some of which may seem preferable to those prevailing.” He suggests “sanctity… stabilizes the conventions
of particular societies by certifying directives, authorities… , and… mythic discourse… , establishing as cor-
rect particular meanings” (Rappaport, 1999, p. 321).
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